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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
Keith B. Halt

This Article discusses Fifth Circuit opinions published in 1999
regarding six topics- removal, abstention, appellate jurisdiction,
defa ult judgment procedure, stan ding, and the first- to-file rule.
I.

REMOVAL

A. Post-Removal Joinder of Nondiverse Defe ndants

I n Cobb v. Delta Exports, Inc., 1 the Fift h Circu it addressed
whether a district court permitting the post- removal joinder of
nondiverse defendants may den y a motion to remand to state
court on the basis that the nondiverse defendants were fr audu
lently joined.2
I n Cobb, the City of L ake Charles engaged a con tractor to re
move tree limbs and other debris after an ice storm.3 The contra
ctor hired a subcontractor, which in turn hired a secon d subcon
tractor. 4 Wh ile removing debris, an employee of the second
subcontractor backed a piece of heavy equipment into a vehicle on
a city street, injuringM r. Cobb, a L ouisiana citizen. 5
M r. Cobb and his wife sued the second subcontractor and its
insurer, both foreign domiciliaries, in state court. 6 The defendants
•
Mr. Hall practices law at Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann & Hutchinson, L.L.P.,
where his work focuses on commercial litigation and toxic torts. He previously served as
Managing Editor of the Loyola Law Review, and he worked as a chemical engineer prior to
attending law school.
1. 1 86 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 1 999).
2. See id. at 676-77.
3. See id. at 676.

4. See id.
5. See id.

6. See Cobb, 1 86 F.3d at 676.
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removed' to federal court on the basis of diversity8 jurisdiction. 9
After removal, the Cobbs filed an unopposed motion to amend
their complaint10 to add claims against the first subcontractor, the
employee who drove the equipment, the City, and the contractor,
the latter two of which are Louisiana domiciliaries. 11 The federal
district court granted the motion to amend, and the Cobbs subse
quently moved to remand. 12 The court denied the remand motion,
concluding that the two Louisiana-domiciled defendants had been
"fraudulently joined."13
Pursuant to the "fraudulent joinder"
o
d ctrine, the existence of diversity jurisdiction is not destroyed by
a plaintiffs fraudulent pleading of jurisdictional facts or by his
assertion of claims against nondiverse defendants against whom
the plaintiff has no possibility of establishing a cause of action. 14
The Cobbs appealed the denial of their remand m otion. 15 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that a remand was required by
28 U.S.C . § 144 7(e), which states that "if after removal the plain
tiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permitjoinder and remand the action to the State Court." 16
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language of the
statute gives the district court only two options-(1) deny joinder
or (2) permitjoinder and remand. 17 Thus, a court may not permit
joinder of nondiverse defendants and then fail to remand. 18
The fraudulent joinder doctrine was inapplicable because
"[t]he fraudulent joinder doctrine does not apply to joinders that
occur after an action is removed."19 The court reasoned that a

7. SeeCobb, 186F.3d at 676; seealso28U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
8. SeeCobb, 186F.3dat 616;seealso28U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
9. SeeCobb, 186F.3dat 676.
10. See id.; seealsoFED. R. C1v. P. 15(a).
11. SeeCobb, 186F.3dat 676.
12. See id.; seealso28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
13. See Cobb, 186F.3dat 676.
14. See id.at 677.
15. See id. at 676.

16. Id.at 677 (citing 28U.S.C. § 1447 (e)).

17. See id.
18. SeeCobb, 186F.3dat 677.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
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district court "woul d n ever" gran t a request to join n ondiverse
defendan ts again st whom recover y is impossibl e. 20 T he court
n oted that because§ 144 7(e) gives a court discretion to prohibit
join der, a defen dan t has a chan ce at the time joind er is requested
to argue that the pl ain tiff has no col orabl e cl aim against the party
that he seeks to join and that join der therefore shoul d n ot be
permitted. 21
The Fifth Circuit al so concl uded that its in terpretation of§
144 7(e) was supported by l egisl ative history- in par ticul ar by
Con gr ess's rejection in 1988 of a proposed version of§ 144 7(e) that
expressl y woul d have given distr ict cour ts the discr etion to retain
jurisdiction after permittin g joinder of n on diverse defendants. 22
Further, the court's hol din g was required by Fift h Circuit prece
den t existin g prior to the adoption of the current version of§
144 7(e). 23 The precedent hel d that "post-removal joind er of a
n on-d iverse, dispensabl e party destroys diversity jurisdiction. "24
Fin all y, the court expl ain ed that Cobb was n ot controll ed by
the S upreme Court's decision in Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v. KN
Energy, Inc. 25 In Freeport-McMoran, two pl ain tiffs brought a
diversity action . 26 After on e of the pl aintiffs transfe rred its in ter
ests to a nondiverse en tity, the pl ain tiffs sought and obtained
leave to amen d their cl aim to substitute the nondiverse party
pursuan t to Federal Rul e of Civil P rocedure 25 (c). 27 After a
verdict for the pl ain tiffs, the court of appeal s r eversed, hol ding
that the district court l acked subject matter jurisdiction aft er the
substitution of the n on diverse par ty because the substitution
destroyed diversity. 28 The S upreme Court reversed the appell ate
court an d produced an opin ion statin g that "if jurisdiction ex
ist[ed) at the time an action [ was] commen ced, such jurisd iction

20.
21.
22.
23.

See Cobb, 1 86 F.3d at 678.
See id.
See id. at 677.
See id.

v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1 1 79, 1 1 8 1 (5th Cir. 1987)).
25. 498 U.S. 426 ( 1 99 1 ) (per curiarn), cited in Cobb, 1 86 F.3d at 678.

24. Id. at 677 (citing Hensgens

26. See Freeport-McMoran, 498 U.S. at 427.
27. See id.

28. See id.
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may not be di vested by subsequent events."29 In Cobb, however,
the Fi fth Ci rcui t d etermi ned that the broad language of Freeport
McMoran was di cta and that the case's holdi ng was li mi ted to
Fed eral Rule of Ci vi l P roced ure 25 substi tuti ons.30 In maki ng that
d etermi nati on, the Fi fth Ci rcui t reli ed on the language of§
144 7(e) and opi ni ons fr om two other appellate courts.3 1
In short, d efend ants may oppose post- removal joi nd er of
nondi verse d efe nd ants agai nst whom plai nti ffs have no colorable
clai m. If, however, nondi verse d efe nd ants are joi ned , the di stric t
court loses subject matter juri sdi cti on and has no power to con
sid er whether joi nd er was fr aud ulent.3 2 The Fi fth Ci rcui t ex
pressly left open, though, the questi on of whether a di stri ct court
may exerci se i ts i nherent power to recall i ts jud gment and wi th
d raw the ord er permi tti ng joi nd er.33
B.

Review of Remand Orders

1.

Remands Not Based on § 1447(c)

In Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc.,34 the Fi fth Ci rcui t ex
ami ned the ci rcumstances und er whi ch 28 U S
. .C. § 144 7(d)
prohi bi ts appellate revi ew of remand s to state court and those
und er whi ch fed eral preempti on of state law provid es fed eral
questi on juri sdi cti on.3 5
In Giles, the plai nti ffs son di ed whi le und er the care of a
medi cal group selected by her health mai ntenance organi zati on
("HM0 ").3 6 The HM O offered i ts servi ces through an employee
benefit plan provid ed by the plai nti ffs employer.37 The plai nti ff
brought clai ms agai nst the HM O, the medi cal group, and two

29. See Freeport-McMoran, 498 U.S. at 428.
30. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 680.

31. See id. at 680-81 (citing Burka v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar o f Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1994)).
32. See Cobb, 186 F.3d at 678.
33. See id. at 678 n.8.
34. 172 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1999).
35. See id. at 336.
36. See id. at 335.
37. See id.
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p hysician s that had treated her son .38 The pl ain tiffs cl aims
i sel ectin g the medical
i cl uded n egl igen ce n
again st her HM O n
group, vicarious liability, breach of con tract, breach of warran ty,
an d misrepresen tation .39 The HM O removed on the basis that the
E mp loyee's Retiremen t In come S ecurity Act ("E RIS A") compl etel y
p reempted the pl ain tiffs cl aims.' 0 The p lain tiff amen ded her
compl ain t to dismiss cl aims for breach of con tract, breach of war
ran ty, an d misrep resen tation , which she con ceded were pre
em pted, an d moved for a reman d. 4 1 The district court reman ded,
con cludin g that E RIS A di d n ot compl etel yp reempt the plain tiffs
remain in g cl aim s an d that the court shoul d util ize its discretion to
refr ain fr om exercisin g suppl emen tal jurisdiction .42
The Fifth Circuit first examin ed whether it had jurisdiction to
. .C. § 144 7(d), an order
hear the appeal .43 P ursuan t to 28 U S
reman din g a case removed to fe deral court gen erall y may n ot be
reviewed.44 However, the S upreme Court has hel d that the
p rohibition on review of reman ds appl ies onl y to § 144 7(c) re
m an ds- that is, rem an ds based on either a defe ct in removal
p rocedure or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction . 45 Accordin gl y, a
litigan t may ap peal a reman d based on discretion ary groun ds.
These groun ds in clude reman ds based on absten tion an d reman ds
based on a court's discretion un der certain groun ds en umerated in
. . C. § 136 7(c) n ot to exercise su ppl emen tal jurisdi ction .4 6
28 U S
H owever, reman d orders are reviewable on ly if the district court
"cl early an d affirm ativel y'' rel ies on a groun d for reman d other
than § 144 7(c).47 In this case, the district court had expressl y
stated that it was rem an din g based on its discretion ary decision

38. See Giles, 172 F.3d at 335 .
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Giles, 1 72 FJd at 335.
44. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1 447(d) (1994)).
45. See id. at 335-36 & n.I. See e.g., Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 5 1 6 U.S. 1 24,
127-28 (1 995); Angelides v. Baylor College of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1 997).
46. See Giles, 172 F.3d at 335-36.
.
47. See id. at 336.
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not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.48 Thus, § 14 47(d) did
notb ar review of the remand order.
Having determined that it could review the remand order, the
court next examined whether ab asis of sub ject matter jurisdiction
exi sted.49 The HM O argued that ER IS A completely preempts
plaintiffs claims and that this preemption created a federal
question.50 Preemption is b ased on the supremacy clause of the
United S tates Constitution.5 1 W hen federal and state laws con
fl ict, the state laws are preempted and have no eff ect. 52 Thus,
preemption b y federal law sometimes is a defense to state law
claims. 53 But under the well- pleaded complaint rule, the exis
tence of a federal law defense to a state law claim does not prov ide
federal question jurisdiction.54 R ather, federal question jurisdic
tion exists only if the plaintiffs well- pleaded complaint is itself
b ased in part on federal law. 55 A ccordingly, ordinary or "confl ict
preemption" does not provide a b asis for federal question jurisdic
tion.116
On the other hand, the doctrine of "complete preemption" pro
vides that federal legislation sometimes will so completely occupy
a particular fi eld that it leaves no room for operation of any state
laws on the s ub ject. 57 In such circumstances, any civil complaint
raising claims in that field is necessarily federal in character,
even if the claims purportedly are b ased on state law. 58 Thus, the

48. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 337-39.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 335, 338.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
52. See id.; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §

9.1 , at 3 1 9 (5th ed. 1 995).
53. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 337.
54. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 2 1 1 U.S. 1 49, 1 52-54 ( 1 908); Giles, 1 72
F.3d at 337.
55. See Mottley, 2 1 1 U.S. at 1 52-54; Giles, 172 F.3d at 337-38.
56. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 337.
57. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 ( 1 987); Giles, 172

F.3d at 336.
58. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 336.
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assertion of completely preempted state law claims raises a
federal question and provides a basis for removal. 59
The Fifth C ircuit reasoned that the plaintiff had originally
raised both claims that possibly were completely preempted and
claims that arguably were confl ict-preempted. 60 The completely
preempted claims, together with supplemental jurisdiction, had
provided a valid basis for removing the entire case. 61 However,
pursuant to the plain tiffs motion , all of the completely preempted
claims had been dismissed.62 The Fift h C ircuit held that when a
district court dismisses the claims that provide the · basis for
original jurisdiction , the district court has discretion whether to
continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the pendant
state law claims or to discontinue exercising supplemental juris
diction and reman d the remaining claims to state court. 63 In
Giles, the Fift h C ircuit held that the district court had not abused
its discretion by remanding the state law claims to state court . 64
Accordingly, the Fift h C ircuit affi rmed . 65
2.

Remands Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

Another E RIS A case, Smith v. Texas Children's Hospital, 66 il
lustrates the principle that if a remand is based on § 144 7(c), then
§ 144 7(d) generally bars appellate review. 67 In Smith, the defen
dant removed on grounds of complete preemption .68 After com
pletely preempted claims were dismissed, the court remanded,
apparen tly based on a discretionary decision n ot to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.6 9 The reman d was appealed, and the
Fift h C ircuit sen t the case back to the district court for reconsid-

59. See Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
60. See id. at 338.
61. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ( 1 994) (supplementaljurisdiction).
62. See Giles, 1 72 F.3d at 338-39.
63. See id. at 338.
64. See id. at 339.
65. See id. at 339-40.
66. 172 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
67. See id. at 924-25.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 925.
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eration of an issue.70 This time the district court remanded on the
basis of§ 1447(c), concluding that it lacked subject matter juris
diction.71 The defendant appealed, arguing that the Fifth Circuit's
prior handling of the case implicitly included a finding that
subject matter jurisdiction existed and that such a finding was
law of the case.72 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating
that pursuant to § 1447(d) it lacked the authority to review the
remand order even if the order was erroneous. 73

II.

BURFORD ABSTENTION

In Webb

v.

B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc ,74 the Fifth Circuit exam
.

ined whether a district court may exercise Burford abstention75 if
the plaintiff asserts no equitable claims and whether a claim in
quantum meruit sounds in equity, thereby allowing remand. 76
The plaintiff in Webb was a state-appointed receiver for an
insolvent insurer.77 The receiver sued one of the insurer's policy
holders to collect unpaid premiums, asserting three alternative
causes of action, including one in quantum meruit.78

The policy

holder removed to federal court on grounds of diversity.79

The

receiver moved to remand, and the court granted the motion
1
based on Burford abstention. 80 The policyholder appealed.8

70. See Smith, 172 F.3d at 925.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 926.
73. See id.; see also Copling v. The Container Store, Inc., 174 F.3d 590, 596 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to
review remand).
74. 174 F.3d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 399 (1999).
75. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943).
76. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 701, 703.
77. See id. at 699.
78. See id.
79. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1994) (establishing diversity jurisdiction and
removal, respectively).
80. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 699.
81. See id.
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The court concluded that it had jurisdiction, 82 then examined
whether the exercise of Burford abstention was proper.83 The
various abstention doctrines permit federal courts in certain
circumstances to abstain fr om hearing cases even though subject
matter jurisdiction exists. 84 The Burford doctrine, for example,
permits a federal court to abstain fr om hearing a case in deference
to complex state administrative procedures. 85 Indeed, Burford
abstention must be exercised by a federal court sitting in equity if
timely and adequate state- court review i s available, and either ( 1)
the case involves diffi cult questions of state law bearing on public
policy issues whose importance transcends the result in the case
before the court, or (2) the federal courts' resolution of the case
would disrupt state efforts to establish a comprehensive policy
regarding an issue of significant public concern.86 But, as was
established by the S upreme Court in Quackenbush, a federal court
has no authority to abstain pursuant to Burford if the court is not
sitting in equity or considering an action in which the grant of
relief is discretionary. 87
In support of the remand, the receiver argued that Quacken
bush's limit on the authority to exercise abstention is not iron
clad.88 The court rejected that argument, concluding that Quack
enbush permitted no exceptions to its rule.89
The court also
dismissed the receiver's citation of a post-Quackenbush Fifth
C ircuit case that affi rmed an abstention-based remand in an

82. The dismissal was a final order so th at jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1 29 1 ,
unless it was otherwise proh ibited. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 699. Although 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d) prohibits appellate review of remand orders based on defective removal procedure or
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the statute does not bar appellate review of remands
based on other grounds, such as abstention. See id. at 700.
83. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 70 1 .
84. See generally Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 1 7 U.S. 706, 7 1 6-23 ( 1 996).
85. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 700. Other absention doctrines include Colorado River,
Younger, Thibodaux, and Pullman. See generally Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 8 1 3- 1 7 ( 1 976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54
(197 1 ); Louisi ana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 25-3 1 ( 1 959);
Railro ad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 3 1 2 U.S. 496, 500-01 ( 1 94 1 ).
86. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 702 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 49 1 U.S. 350, 36 1 (1 989)).
87. See Webb, 1 74 F.3d at 701 (citing Quackenbush, 5 1 7 U.S. 730-3 1 ).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 702.
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insurance case in which no equitab le relief was sought,90 notin g
that the cited case did not confr ont the issue of whether the
nature of the relief sought precluded ab stention. 91
The receiver's final argument in favor of ab stention was that
quantum meruit is an equitab le form of relief and that a court
may ab stain and remand a case that includes actions at law i f at
least one cause of action is b ased in equity. 92 The court rejected
the receiver's final argument b ecause the court concluded that
actions for relief in quantum meruit are legal, not equi table
causes of action. 93
Thus, although the Fifth Circuit entertained the proposi tion
that a state's plan to deal with insolvent insurers often will justify
Burford ab stention,94 the court reversed the remand order on
grounds that a court errs if it ab stains in a case involvi ng n o
claims for equitab le or discretionary reli ef. 95
The court expressly stated that, b ecause it determined that
quantum meruit is a legal action, it did n ot reach the i ssue of
whether the existence of one equitab le claim would permit a court
to ab stain and remand an entire case if the case also included
legal claims. 96 But a dissenting opinion implicitly reached that
issue. 97 The dissenting opinion concluded that quantum meruit
sounds in equityb ut failed to expressly address whether an enti re
case may b e remanded b ased on ab stention if some, b ut not all,
claims sound in equity. 98 Because the dissent concluded that the
district court's order remanding the enti re case should b e af
firmed, the dissenting opinion implicitly answered that a sin gle

90. See Clark v. Fitzgibbons, 1 05 F.3d 1 049, 1 052 (5th Cir. 1 997).
See Webb, 174 F.3d at 702 & n.9.
See id. at 701 & n.6.
See id. at 704--05 .
See id. at 701-02.
95. See id. at 699, 702, 704-05.
96. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 701 & n.6.
97. See generally id. at 705- 1 0 (Politz, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 707 (Politz, J., dissenting).
91.
92.
93.
94.
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equitable claim may justify remanding an entire case based on
abstention. 99
III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A.

Simultaneous Remand to State Court and Finding
of No Personal Jurisdiction

The issue before the Fifth Circuit in Falcon v. Transportes
Aeros de Coahuila, S.A. 100 was a novel question of appellate
jurisdiction101-whether a defendant may appeal a lower court's
order by finding that personal jurisdiction exists, if the order is
issued simultaneously with an order remanding the case to state
court. 102

In Falcon, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action after a
plane crash in Mexico.103 The defendants removed104 the case to
federal court, asserting the existence of federal question jurisdic
tion105 under the federal common law of international relations
and treatyinterpretation. 106 The plaintiff then moved to remand107
to state court, and the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.108
The court initially dismissed the case as to one of the defen
dants, the air carrier, for lack of personal jurisdiction. 109 But the
court reversed itself after finding that new evidence established
the existence of personal jurisdiction as to the air carrier. 110 The
court issued a new order that vacated the earlier dismissal and
held that personal jurisdiction existed. 111 On the same day that

99. See Webb, 174 F.3d at 710 (Politz, J. , dissenting).
100. 169 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1999).
101. See Falcon, l 69 F.3d at 310 ("This appeal presents us with a novel question .. . . ).
102. See id.
"

103. See id. at 310.
104. See id. at 3 11; see also 28 U.S. C. § 1441 (1994).
105. See Falcon, l 69 F.3d at 311; see also 28 U.S. C. § 1331 (1994).
106. See Falcon, l 69 F.3d at 311.
107. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ( l 994).
108. See Falcon, 169 F.3d at 311.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.

112
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the court issued the order holding that personal jurisdiction
existed, it also issued an order remanding the case to state court
for lack of subj ect matter jurisdiction. 112 The remand was not a
reV iewable order. 113 The initially -dismissed defendant appealed,
114
however, the order which held that personal jurisdiction exi sted.
The air carrier argued that appellate jurisdiction exi sted un
der 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine. 115 Although
interfo cutory decisions generally may not be appealed, the collat
eral order doctrine provides that an interlocutory decision may be
appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if the decision "fi nally deter
mine[s] claims of right separable fr om, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consider
ation be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 116
Further, even after a case has been remanded to state court,
the doctrine permits federal appellate review of district court
orders that preceded the remand order both " in logic and in fa ct"
and that also are " conclusive," meaning " functionally unreview
able in the state court." 117 In Falcon, the appellate court fo cused
whether the jurisdiction order was conclusive, an issue that the
court note d was one offi rst impression. 118
The court reasoned that if the state court could reexamine the
personal jurisdiction issue, the order was not conclusive and not

112. See Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 1 .
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 447(d) ( 1 994); see also Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 I n. l (citing

Angelides v. Baylor College of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 835-36 (5th Cir. 1 997) (holding that a
remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable)).
114. See Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 1 .
115. See Falcon, 1 69 F.3d at 3 1 1 .
116. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 54 1 , 546 ( 1 949)).
117. Id. at 311 (quoting Ange/ides, 1 17 F.3d at 837 (citing City of Waco v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 1 40, 1 43 ( l 934); Linton v. Airbus lndustrie, 3 0 F.3d 592, 597
(5th Cir. 1 994))).
118. See Fa/con, 169 F .3d at 3 1 1 -12. The court cast the question of whether an order is
"conclusive" as turning on whether the order is a ''.jurisdictional" issue that could be reviewed
in a state court or a "substantive" issue that could not be reviewed in state court. See id. The
court's analysis, however (as well as the analysis in the case on which the Falcon court
relied), focused on whether the order would have preclusive effect in state court, rather than
whether the order should be labeled "substantive" or "jurisdictional." See id.; see also
Ange/ides, 1 1 7 F.3d at 837.
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subject to federal appellate review.119 In turn, whether the state
court could reexamine the personal jurisdiction issue or whether
the district court's order had preclusive effect that would bar such
reexamination would turn on the federal law of collateral estop
0
pel. 12 The Fifth Circuit found that the order did not have preclu
sive effect because none of the requirements for the federal
doctrine of collateral estoppel were satisfied. 121 Accordingly, the
personal jurisdiction order was subject to reexamination in state
court, was therefore not "conclusive," and was not subject to
federal appellate review.122 The appeal was dismissed. 123
B.

Rule 54(b) Certification

In Briargrove Shopping Center Joint Venture v. Pilgrim
Enterprises,
Inc., 124 the Fifth
Circuit
examined
what
circumstances permit appeal of a partial judgment, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), if the district court has not
expressly stated that it finds "no just reason for delay'' of an
appeal.12s
In Briargrove, a shopping center owner found on its property,
contaminants of a type sometimes used in dry cleaning opera
tions. 126 The owner sued its former tenant, a former dry cleaner
operator, asserting common law claims and a claim under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
1
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 96 01-9675. 12 The district
court entered a declaratory judgment addressing only the CER
CLA claim and finding the defendant liable on that claim.128 The
same day, the court entered a judgment that it captioned "Final
Judgment."129 This second judgment held the defendant liable for

119. See Falcon, 169 F.3d at 312-13.
120. See id. at 312.
121. See id. at 312-13.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 313.
124. 170 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1999).
125. See id. at 539.
126. See id. at 538.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 538.
129. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538.
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cleanup costs, pursuant to the fi ndings in the declaratory judg
ment and closed with the sentence: " This is a Final J udgment."130
The defendant ap pealed. 13 1
The Fifth Circuit examined whether it had jurisdiction, noting
that it has jurisdiction only fr om (1) fi nal decisions under 28
U .S .C. § 1291, (2) interlocutory orders under§ 1292, (3) judgments
certified asfi nal under Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 54( b), and
(4 ) some other non- final order or judgment to which an exception
applies. 132 The district court's " Final J udgment" was not a final
decision under § 1291 because it did not "end[] the litigation on
the merits." 133 The common law claims and cross-claims r e
mained . 134 Neither did the judgment satisfy the requirements of§
1292.135 Thus, the Fift h Circuit had appellate jurisdiction only if
the district court's judgment was appealable under R ule 54( b). 136
U nd er R ule 54( b), a " court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to . . . fewer than all of the claims . . . only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason fo r delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."1 37 In the
absence of these requirements, an order that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims does not terminate the action, no matter how
the order is designated. 138 In order to satisfy the requirements of
R ule 54( b), a district court must determfo e that it is rendering a
final judg ment and must determine that there exists no just
reason for delay. 139 The Fifth Circuit has held that the district
court need not use the words " no j ust reason for delay" in order to
make a R ule 54( b) certification. 140 However, the order fr om which
an appeal is taken, together with any portions of the record to

130. Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538.
131. See id. at 537.
132. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 538.
133. Id. at 538-39.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 538-39.
136. See id. at 539.
137.
138.
139.
140.

FED. R. C1v. P. 54(b), quoted in Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539.
See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539.
See id.
Id.
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which the order refers, must show the district court's "unmistak
able intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). "141
Here, the order did not show such an unmistakable intent.
The district court did not refer to Rule 54, and neither party had
filed a motion mentioning the rule.142 Further, before making a
Rule 54(b) justification, a court must make at least some findings
concerning the substantive issues relating to Rule 54(b) certifica
tion.143 The district court, however, did not issue any orders or
memoranda that discussed those issues.144 That the district court
styled its order "Final Judgment" does not satisfy Rule 54(b).145
Indeed, Rule 54(b) makes clear that "however designated," an
order is appealable as a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)
only if the Rule's substantive requirements are met.146
Finally, the defendant argued that the district court's approval
of a supersedeas bond indicated that the court intended a Rule
54(b) certification.147 But in determining whether a court intended
a Rule 54(b) certification, only the order from which appeal is
taken, and any part of the record to which the order refers, may
be consulted.148 The appealed order did not refer to the su
persedeas bond, so it could not be considered.149 Further, the Fifth
Circuit noted that even if it could consider the order approving a
supersedeas bond, that order would not show an unmistakable
intent that the order appealed from be certified under Rule
54(b).150 Thus, the order was not appealable under Rule 54, and
the appeal was dismissed.151

141. Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539 (quoting Kelly
908F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane)).
142. See id. at 539-40.
143. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 539-40.
144. See id. at 540.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Briargrove, 170 F.3d at 540.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 54 l .
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IV. DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE

The issue before the Fifth C ircuit in Rogers v. Hartford Life
152
and Accident Insurance Co.
was whether waiver of service153
constitutes an appearance for purposes of Federal Rule of C ivil
Procedure 5 5 (b)(2), so as to trigger the rule's requirement that
written notice be given at least three days prior to a hearing on 2n
application for judgment by default. 154
In Rogers, the plaintiff brought an E RIS A claim again st his
former employer and the insurer that provided benefits under the
employer's long-term disability plan. 155 The former employer was
6
served with process, and the insurer waived service of process.15
Aft er the defendants failed to answer timely, the clerk of court
fi led an entry of default at the plaintiffs request. 157 L ater, after a
hearing, the district court entered a default judgment against
both defendants. 158 The defendants learned of the default judge
ment over a month later and moved to have the judgment set
aside. 159 The court denied the motions, and the defendants ap
pealed. 160
On appeal, the insurer pointed out that Rule 5 5 (b)(2) requires
that written notice be given to any defendant who has appeared in
an action at least three days prior to a hearing on an application
for a default judgment, and no such notice had been given. 161 The
insurer argued that it made an appearance by waiving fo rmal
service of process. 162

152. 1 67 F.3d 933 (5th Cir. I 999).
153. See FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d).
154. See Rogers, I 67 F.3d at 936.
155. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 935.
156. See id. The plaintiff made service by sending a copy of the summons and complaint to
the plan administrator in New Orleans. See id. The plaintiff also requested that the insurer's
out of state agent execute a waiver of service. See id.
157. See id.; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 55(a).
158. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 935; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 55(b)(2). The district court
opinion is reported in Rogers v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 1 78 F.R.D. 933
(S.D. Miss. 1997).
159. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 935-36.
160. See id. at 936.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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The Fifth Circuit noted that its policy favors resolving cases on
the merits, rather than by default judgments. 163 Consistent with
this policy, the court has taken an expansive view as to what
constitutes an appearance under Rule 55(b)(2).16 4 Under the
court's expansive view, a defendant makes an appearance by
taking any action that is responsive to the plaintiffs formal suit
that gives the plaintiff a clear indication that the defendant
intends to defend the suit.165 Such action can even consist of
informal acts that demonstrate that the defendant will contest the
claim.166 The insurer argued that these requirements were met by
its waiver of service and by plaintiffs knowledge that the insurer
had denied plaintiffs claim for benefits. 167
The court analyzed the interrelations of Rules 4, 12, and 55.168
The court noted that a plaintiff may not obtain an entry of default
or a default judgment unless a defendant has failed to answer as
required by the Federal Rules. 169 In addition, a defendant is not
required to answer until after service is made or waived. 170 Hence,
a plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the defendant
fails to answer timely once the plaintiff has either served the
defendant or secured a waiver of service.
The court next considered whether acceptance of formal ser
vice can constitute an appearance that triggers the notice re
quirement of Rule 55(b)(2).171 The court observed that the rule's
language shows that its notice requirement is intended to apply
only in some circumstances in which a plaintiff is entitled to seek
a default. 172 But, discounting waivers of service, the rule's three
day notice would always apply if acceptance of service was an
"appearance," because a plaintiff cannot be entitled to a default

163. SeeRogers, 167 F.3d at 936.
164. Seeid.
165. Seeid. at 937.
166. SeeRogers, 167 F.3d at937.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Seeid. at 937; seealso FED. R. C1v. P. 55.
170. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 12(a); FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d)(3).
171. SeeRogers, 167 F.3d at937.
172. Seeid. at 937.
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unless s ervice has been made. 173 The court conceded that a waiv
ing s ervice is diff erent fr om accepting s ervice, but als o noted that
a defe ndant's waiver ofs er vice s ubs titutes for the plaintiff maki ng
s ervice, and that a waiver of s ervice, like the making of servi ce,
trigg ers a de fendant' s oblig ation to answer. 174 Thus , concluded the
court, neither accepting nor waiving service constitutes an ap
pearance for purposes of Rule 55( b)( 2), s o as to require a wri tten
notice pr ior to a default judg ment. 175
Finally , the Fifth C ircuit rejected the defe ndants ' arg ument
that their failure to ans wer w as excus able neg lect and held that
under the facts of Rogers, the district court did not abuse i ts
dis cretion in refus ing to s et as ide the default judgment under
Rule 60( b)(l ).176 According ly , the district court's judg ment was
affi rmed. 177
V.

STANDING

A.

Congressional Modification of Prudential Standing
Rules Via NVRA

In Association of Community O rganizations For Reform Now v.
Fowler, 178 the Fifth C ircuit address ed iss ues concerning both the
cons tit utional and prudential limitations on..s tanding . 179
In Fowler, the As sociation of C ommunity Org anizati on for Re
form Now ( " AC ORN") broug ht s uit ag ainst L ouis iana of fici als,
alleg ing that L ouis iana's voter reg is tration procedures vi olate
s everal provis ions of the National Voter Regis tration Act
("NVRA"), 4 2 U .S. C . § 1973 gg .180 In particular, AC ORN alleg ed
173. See Rogers, 1 67 F.3d at 937.
174. See id. at 937-38.
175. See id. at 938. The appellate court also held that the plaintiffs service on the former

employer was a proper method of service under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and
therefore proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). See Rogers 1 6 7 F.3d at 940.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusfng to set aside the default judgments
under Rule 60(b)(l). See id. at 940--943.
176. See id. at 938.
177. See id. at 944.
178. 1 78 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1 999).
179. See id. at 356-65.
180. See id. at 353.
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that L ouisiana violated the NVRA by failing to make voter
r egistr ation mater ials available at public aid offices, by failing to
include voter r egistr ation car ds in packets that per mitted dr iver 's
license r enewals by mail, and by impr oper ly pur ging names fr om
voter r olls. 18 1 The defendants moved for summar y judgment on
the gr ound that AC ORN lacked standing. 182 The distr ict cour t
gr anted the motion, concluding that AC ORN lacked standing to
sue on its own behalf or as ar epr esentative of its member s. 183
Reviewing the distr ict cour t' s gr ant of summar y judgment de
novo, 184 the Fifth C ir cuit began by examining whether AC ORN
had standing to sue on its own behalf. 185 The cour t noted that
standing is gover ned both by constitutional r equir ements and
pr udential limitations. 186 The constitutional r equir ements for
standing ar ise fr om Ar ticle Ill 's case or
contr over sy
8
1
r equir ement. 7 The pr udential limitations on standing ar ise fr om
jur ispr udence only and can be modifi ed or abr ogated by
C ongr ess . 188
To br ing a claim, a plaintiff must have Ar ticle III standing,
and he must satisfy the r equir ements of pr udential standing

unless the r equir ements of pr udential standing have been
waived. 189 Addr essing Ar ticle III standing fir st, the cour t noted
that an or ganization' s standing to sue on its own behalf is
m easur ed by the same standar d as applies to individuals . 190 That
standar d r equir es that the plaintiff demonstr ate " injur y in fact"
that is "fair ly tr aceable" to the defendant's actions, " and that the
i njury will likely be r edr essed by a favor able decision. " 19 1 An

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 355.
See id.
See id. at 355-56.
See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 356.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 356.
See id. (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 ( 1 982)).
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org ani zati on can demonstrate i njury i n fact by showi ng " concrete
and d emonstrable i njury to the org ani zati on's acti vi tes." 192
The court rejected ACOR N's asserti on that i ts costs of
li tig ati on ag ai nst the defendants quali fied as an i njury i n fact. 193
If costs of li tig ati ng the very case i n whi ch standi ng i s challeng ed
quali fied as an i njury i n fact, the requi rement of i njury always
would be sati fied . 194 The court also rejected ACOR N's asserti on
tli at i ts costs of moni tori ng whether L oui si ana com pli ed wi th the
NVRA quali fied as an i njury i n fact. 195
The problem wi th
ACORN 's alleg ati on reg ardi ng i ts moni tori ng costs was that
ACOR N had sugg ested that i ts moni tori ng acti vi ty was part of i ts
normal operati ons, not somethi ng done as a result of L oui si ana' s
aU eg ed NVRA vi olati ons.196
Fi nally, ACOR N poi nted to costs that i t i ncurred i n conducti ng
voter reg istrati on dri ves. 197 The court concluded that most of
ACOR N's voter reg i strati on acti vi tes were not shown to be the
result of alleg ed NVRA vi olati ons by L oui si ana. 198 But, ACORN's
summary judg ment evi dence showi ng
that i t conducted
reg i strati on dri ves focused on people i n " welfare wai ti ng rooms,
unem ploym ent offices, and on Food S tamp li nes" was suffici ent to
rai se a g enui ne i ssue reg ardi ng whether ACOR N would have
i ncurred the expenses of those reg i strati on dri ves i f L oui si ana had
compli ed wi th NVRA 's requi rement that voter reg i strati on
materials be avai lable at publi c aid offices. 199 T hus, ACOR N
establi shed Arti cle III stand i ng as to i ts clai m reg ard i ng lack of
voter materi als at publi c ai d offi ces. 200 ACORN, however, fai led to
show Arti cle III standi ng reg ardi ng i ts other clai ms because i t
fai led to show i njury ari si ng fr om the other alleg ed NVRA

192. Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 357 (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363

(1 982)).
193. See id. at 358.
194. See id. at 358-59.
195. See id. at 359.
196. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 359.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 360.
199. See id. at 361 .
200. See id. at 362.
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violations.201 Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary
judgment was reversed as to the claim regarding lack of voter
materials at public aid offices, but was affirmed regarding
ACORN's other claims brought on its own behalf. 202
Because ACORN demonstrated Article III standing as to one
of its claims, the court next addressed whether ACORN satisfied
the requirements of prudential standing as to that claim.203 The
prudential limitations on standing generally require that a
plaintiffs grievance arguably falls within a zone of interest
protected by the statute at issue, that a claim not raise purely
abstract questions or generalized grievances best addressed by the
legislative branch, and that the plaintiff be asserting its own
rights, rather than those of others . 204 The court's analysis,
however, focused not on whether these requirements were met,
but whether the requirements were waived by the NVRA.205
After acknowledging again that Congress may alter or
abrogate the requirements of prudential standing, the court noted
that the NVRA provides that after a "person who is aggrieved by a
violation of NVRA"206 satisfies certain notice requirements, the
"aggrieved person may bring a civil action in an appropriate
district court."207 Although the NVRA does not define "aggrieved
person," the court relied on jurisprudence interpreting similar
language in other federal statutes and concluded that Congress
had intended to abrogate the requirements of prudential standing
in order "to extend standing under the [NVRA] to the maximum
allowable under the Constitution . "208 Further, based on the
provision in 1 U .S .C .§ 1, in federal statutes the word "person"
includes corporations, associations, and various other entities,

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 362.
See id. at 365.
See id. at 362-63.
See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 363.
See id. at 363-64.

206. Id. at 363 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1 973 gg-9(b)( I ) ( 1 994)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
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except if provided otherwise, and because NVRA does not provide
otherwise, ACORN qualifed as a "person aggrieved."209
The
court
then
analyzed
whether
ACORN
had
210
An
representational standing to litigate claims of its members.
association has representative standing if (a) its members would
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests that the
association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
1
individual members to participate in the lawsuit. 2 1 The court
concluded that except on the claim regarding the failure to supply
voter registration materials at public aid offices, a claim on which
ACORN had standing in its own right, ACORN failed to show that
any of its members would have standing in their own right. 212
Thus, ACORN's representational standing was restricted to the
. same claim on which it had standing in its own right .
. Accordingly, the lower court's grant of summary judgment was
reversed as to the single claim, but otherwise affirmed. 2 13
B.

Congressional Modification of Prudential Standing
Rules Via FRCP 17

The Fifth Circuit discussed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17's effect on third party standing limitations in Ensley v. Cody
Resources, Inc. 214 In Ensley, the plaintiff formed a closely-held
corporation, through which he did work for the defendant on
numerous transactions.215 The parties reduced their agreement to
writing for a few early transactions, but not for later
transactions. 216
The defendant eventually terminated its
relationship with the plaintiff, who subsequently sued for shares
of stock allegedly owed to him by the defendant in lieu of a

209. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 364-65.
210. See id. at 365.
211. See id. at 365 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,

343 ( 1 977)).
212. See id. at 365-67.
213. See Fowler, 1 78 F.3d at 367-68.
214. 1 7 1 F.3d 3 1 5 , reh 'g denied, 1 8 1 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1 999).
215. Id. at 3 1 7.
216. See id. at 3 1 7- 1 8.
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commission for work on a transaction where terms were not
reduced to writing. 2 17 At the close of the plaintiffs case-in-chief,
the defendant moved for a judgment as a matter of law.218 The_
court denied the motion and later entered judgment on a
subsequent jury verdict that found the defendant liable in
quantum meruit, but not in contract.219
The defendant again moved for a judgment as a matter of law,
arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because the claim he
asserted belonged to his closely-held corporation, not to him.220
The court initially granted the renewed motion.221 But later, the
court sua sponte reversed course, reasoning that the actual basis
of the defendant's objection was a real-party-in-interest objection
that was waived because it was not raised before trial.222 The
defendant appealed the court's reentry of judgment for the
.
223
p1 amt'ff.
1
•

The Fifth Circuit noted that standing includes both
constitutional limitations and prudential limitations on the claims
that may be litigated in federal court. 224 One of the prudential
limitations is that a plaintiff generally may not bring a claim that
is based on the rights of third parties. 225 However, because the
limitation on third party standing is not constitutional, the
Congress may alter or abrogate the general prohibition on third
party claims.226 In fact, Congress has altered third party standing
limitations by regulating the real-party-in-interest objection
through Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 17;227 those rules
provide that a real-party-in-interest defense must be raised in a
responsive pleading.228 Because the defendant waited until the

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Ensley, 1 7 1 F.3d at 3 1 8 .
See id. ; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of law).
See Ensley, 1 7 1 F.3d at 3 1 8.
See id.
See id.
See id. ; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 1 7 .
See Ensley, 1 7 1 F.3d at 3 1 8- 1 9.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 3 20 .
See id. ; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 1 2 (defenses must be asserted in

227.
.
ings);
FED. R. C1v. P. 1 7 (real-party-in-interest).
228.

See Ensley,

1 7 1 F.3d at 320.
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end of plaintiffs case-in�hief to assert its objection, the defense
was waived.229
0
affirmed.23
VI.

Accordingly, the district court's judgment was

FIRST-TO-FILE RULE

The Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court's application of the
1
In Whata
v. Whataburger, Inc. 23

first-to-file rule in Cadle Co.

burger, a company filed claims in the bankruptcy proceedings of a
debtor in the Southern District of Texas, attempting to recover on
a prior j udgment.232 After a setback in the bankruptcy proceeding,
the company filed a complaint in the federal district court for the
Western District of Texas.233 The complaint named associates and
family members of the debtor as defendants, and alleged that the
defendants helped the debtor fraudulently transfer assets to avoid
payment on the prior judgment.234

The defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint on the basis of the first-to-file rule, and the
court granted the motion. 235
The plaintiff appealed, asserting that the district court should
not have applied the first-to-file rule without first determining
6
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over his claim. 23
In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that the district court
should have transferred, rather than dismissed, the case .237 As a
preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit noted

the

standard of

review.238 Generally, application of the first-to-file rule, a discre
tionary doctrine, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.239

But be

cause the plaintiff raised issues regarding the nature and scope of

229.
230.
23 1.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Ensley, 1 7 1 F.3d at 320.
See id. at 3 2 1 , 323.
1 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1 999).
Id. at 60 1 .
See id. at 602.
See Cadle, 1 74 FJd at 601.
See id.
See id. at 600, 602-03.
See id. at 600, 606.
See id. at 603.
See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 603.
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the doctrine, rather than its application on the facts, the district
court's ruling was reviewed de novo .240
Next, the appellate court examined the first-to-file rule it
self. 24 1 The rule has the purpose of serving judicial economy and
comity. 242 Under the rule, when related cases are pending before
two district courts, the second court should determine whether
there exists substantial overlap in the issues raised by the two
cases.243 If substantial overlap exists, the second court generally
must transfer its case to the court in which the first action was
filed. 244 Then, the court where the first action was filed deter
mines whether the second suit should be "dismissed, stayed or
transferred and consolidated."245
Addressing the plaintiffs arguments, the Fifth Circuit rejected
the contention that a federal court should determine whether
another court has jurisdiction before applying the first-to-file
rule.246 The court contrasted the first-to-file rule with collateral
estoppel, which applies only if the court making a prior ruling had
jurisdiction. 247 Both the first-to-file rule and collateral estoppel
promote judicial economy, but they do so in different ways.248
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues on which a court
already has ruled. 249 But a ruling is void if rendered by a court
that lacks jurisdiction.250 Thus, because collateral estoppel binds
litigants to a prior ruling, it makes sense to require that a court
apply collateral estoppel only after finding that the prior court
had jurisdiction. 251

240. See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 603.
241. See id. at 603-06.
242. See id. at 603.
243. See id. at 605.
244. See id. at 605-606.
245. Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 606.
246. See id. at 603.
247. See id. at 603-04.
248. See id. at 603.
249. See id.
250. See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 603-04.
251. See id.
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In contrast to collateral estoppel, the first-to-file rule does not
bind litigants to a prior ruling. 252 Instead, the rule promotes judi
cial economy by avoiding wasteful parallel litigation when there
exists a pending case that raises substantially the same issues.253
Requiring the second court to examine whether the first court had
jurisdiction might undermine judicial economy and result in both
courts examining the same issue. 254 While the j urisdiction of the
first court might sometimes be worthy of consideration in deciding
whether to follow the first-to-file rule, the first court itself is the
court to consider that issue-after the second case is transferred
to it.255 Thus, the district court in Cadle, as the "second" court, did
not err by limiting its inquiry to whether a substantial overlap of
issues existed. 256

The district court erred by dismissing, how

ever. 257 The district court should have transferred and let the first
court decide what to do with the transferred case.258

The Fifth

Circuit vacated and remanded, with instructions to transfer the
case to the first court. 259

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 604.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 606.
See id. at 605-06.
See Cadle, 1 74 F.3d at 606.
See id.
See id.

